Published 1996
by National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, MA .
Written in English
Edition Notes
| Statement | Paul L. Joskow, Richard Schmalensee, Elizabeth M. Bailey. |
| Series | NBER working paper series -- working paper 5745, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 5745. |
| Contributions | Schmalensee, Richard., Bailey, Elizabeth M., National Bureau of Economic Research. |
| The Physical Object | |
|---|---|
| Pagination | 33, [12] p. : |
| Number of Pages | 33 |
| ID Numbers | |
| Open Library | OL22411910M |
Auction Design and the Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions. Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of created a market for electric utility emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2). Recent papers have argued that flaws in the design of the auctions that are part of this market have adversely affected its performance. These papers incorrectly assume that trade can only occur at auctions, however. Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of created a market for electric utility emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2). Recent papers have argued that flaws in the design of the auctions that are part of this market have adversely affected its performance. These papers incorrectly assume that trade can only occur at auctions, however. Our empirical analysis of the SO2 emissions market shows. Downloadable! Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of created a market for electric utility emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2). Recent papers have argued that flaws in the design of the auctions that are part of this market have adversely affected its performance. These papers incorrectly assume that trade can only occur at auctions, however.
@article{osti_, title = {The politics and economics of auction design in the market for sulfur dioxide pollution}, author = {Hausker, K}, abstractNote = {The Clean Air Act Amendments of aim to create a market in emissions of sulfur dioxide from power plants by distributing a fixed number of tradable pollution permits called allowances,' and by providing for the auction of a small. Abstract. Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of created a market for electric utility emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2). Recent papers have argued that flaws in the design of the auctions that are part of this market have adversely affected its performance. AUCTION DESIGN AND THE MARKET FOR SULFUR DIOXIDE EMISSIONS ABSTRACT Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of created a market for electric utility emissions of sulfur dioxide (SOZ), Recent papers have argued that flaws in the design of the auctions that are part of this market have adversely affected its performance. Market Design Last updated: 2/3/14 This is an advanced topics course on market and mechanism design. We will study existing or new market institutions, understand their properties, and think about whether they can be re-engineered or improved. This course assumes knowledge of the rst year economics PhD.
The Clean Air Act Amendments of aim to create a market in emissions of sulfur dioxide from power plants by distributing a fixed number of tradable pollution permits called “allowances. Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee & Elizabeth M. Bailey, "Auction Design and the Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions," NBER Working Papers , National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Burtraw, Dallas & McCormack, Kristen, "Consignment auctions of free emissions allowances," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. (C), pages Auction design and the market for sulfur dioxide emissions. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, © (OCoLC) Material Type: Government publication, National government publication, Internet resource: Document Type: Book, Internet Resource: All Authors / . The Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions By PAUL L. JOSKOW, RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, AND ELIZABETH M. BAILEY The Clean Air Act Amendments initiated the first large-scale use of the tradable permit approach to pollution control. The theoretical case for this ap-proach rests on the assumption of an efficient market for emission rights. Our.
